

Dresden

As with Hiroshima - Nagasaki

support for credibility of our will + ^{domestic} ~~politic~~ ^{esp.:}
to carry out threats of EU
vs. Soviets.

"demo" on desert island
But ~~only~~ didn't demonstrate
tho. rights were right the
and before a chance to demonstrate!

(possibly - bygone -
also ordering bargaining
value of offer of partnership.)
("control")

(since "otherwise...")

(= Dec. 72 ; Cambodia ... Laotian ...
(+ Hanoi, "some dikes")

e.g. if

State was in

total war! (State - they're raising the price")

Frighl - to your death - to protect my privilege
rice death, ~~the~~ while coming others!

MS

Last Lecture

Burning the earth.

How to buy - "hundreds..."

Seating U-bus on Hiroshima:

On

"~~On~~"

Conant

(see file duration 42)

target is "burning,"
cities)

(an account of the:

- industry / transport

- burning

note: people (genocide)
"normal"

NEVER AN ESTIMATE
OF HUMANS TO DIE

Destruction of "will"

(see Rotterdam, Warsaw...)
Dresden...

Reason for A-bomb:

(no time? - cover)

see w/ not Kyoto

w/ Hiroshima spread
earlier

NOW, YES:

N RETAL

R, IN COMPARISON

O OUR 24

TRIKE FATAL

OR SU'S FROM

US 2d; 07

15 1st...)

see RMN: ~~the~~ / Moore, May '72
NAK: surprise blow Dec '72)

"experiment":

What justified? (B) - Human as "enemy": see Jan '42,
Final Solution

Triumph of Hitler

Ritzsch: Monsters... abys

Dallas on abys

(Dresden a Blind Ambition: mad - USG!)

(b) Human A-Bomb

What if war had gone on...

What if Human again of

Manhattan Project, starting

in Jan '42 (US)?

Human effort stalled

in Jan '42!

burning, Dai

W/ don't you know that -

US "Army" went

TOKYO...
(DRESDEN?)

IF HIROSHIMA WAS ALL

RIGHT...

Barrs: Megamurder

"unified in France"

10 May 1940: attack on Freiburg-in-Breisgau (by ~~then~~ plans!)
→ ~~then~~ targets → UK targets, withdrawing
1 Sept 39 pledge not to bomb civs.

Rottterdam - after cif's murder - too late to stop. [S10P]

Σ

[B-52s over VN, 1965!]

✓ see my feelings, then!]

✓ then gas]

RT - civ. efforts to slow monster

vs. JCS, "concentration
very
targets - ill."

civ. pressure (Hitler, too)

for threats (torture) vs. "human"

by Ditch, in Work

Exaggeration of casualties at Rotterdam, for prop.

780 killed/

30X -

→ expectations (of civs, RAF)

demand for revenge.

see Qui Non/DE
VC "strategies"

[see effect of exaggeration of

a) ~~then~~ bombers numbers (Klin)

(✓ then mob.)

b) Effects of bombing - e.g. - London, 1938

ON MUNICH [cf. Berlin, '61]

stood:

I am Time, Destroyer of the worlds.
(S) Fully grown (or developed)
Come here to mark the worlds.

taking together
my things

I am Time (kāla)
worlds - destruction - marker

Edgerton
I am Time [Death]
The cause of the destruction of the worlds
Marked and set out to gather in
the worlds here.

laka
/

KAL/DE
[Kietrus
Cambodian
PP (ME) (1970-
1973

only
Time [Death] Howard Pinos
Franklin Edgerton
1944 book translation

[Death]
kāla

None of the others say "Death"
not "peoples" - "worlds"

Diff. to now
Options

Edgerton
Even without this, all shall
cease to exist. The warrior
that are drawn.

The Secret History of Combing

What are precedents? Was there a

Trench - France? Before WWI

- blockade (yes UK in WWI
and after;

- siege

- rapid after

(why not: Germany, France, SU? Japan?

why: Dardanelles / Helles

Hyp: WWI influenced bloodletting (esp. of
airstreams). "Never again."

France - Maginot Line, concrete

UK - airpower

Right strat. heading, for UK, 1942-43:

- For now, even options (Lindemann
Rostow: "Judgment
Lenses")

(Compare lines to
RT/VN)

- For other side RT/MCN

"What's your alternative?"

(No-win - HK: "No thing of victory" (Schelling, 1963)⁶³)

No way to "press" enemy, to achieve terms;

No way to reason public that one was
trying to end conflict successfully

(Compare HK's call in VN for - "they of victory,"
and HAK's call - '50's for a "strategic
doctrine," that provided for using arms,
to win.)

* Even if exchange was two-sided, a contract
of will, "chicken", for UK/US part:
a chance to volunteer British public - SEE HO/VN
- 1964-67!

know how many of them believed what they were told. I knew only that what they were told was untrue. By January 1944 the battle was lost. I had seen the bomb patterns, which showed bombs scattered over an enormous area. The bomber losses were rising sharply. There was no chance that our continuing the offensive in this style could have any decisive effect on the war. It was true that Berlin contained a great variety of important war industries and administrative centers. But Bomber Command was not attempting to find and attack these objectives individually. We merely showered incendiary bombs over the city in as concentrated a fashion as possible, with a small fraction of high-explosive bombs to discourage the fire-fighters. Against this sort of attack the defense could afford to be selective. Important factories were protected by fire-fighting teams who could deal quickly with incendiaries falling in vital areas. Civilian housing and shops could be left to burn. So it often happened that Bomber Command "destroyed" a city, and photographic reconnaissance a few weeks later showed factories producing as usual amid the rubble of burnt homes.

On just two occasions during the war, a Bomber Command incendiary attack was outstandingly successful. This happened first in Hamburg in July 1943. We started so many fires in a heavily built-up area that a fire storm developed, a hurricane of flame that killed forty thousand people and destroyed everything in its path. None of our other attacks had produced effects that were a tenth as destructive as the effects of a fire storm. The only way we could have won a militarily meaningful victory in the battle of Berlin was to raise a fire storm there. Conceivably, a giant fire storm raging through Berlin could have fulfilled the dreams of the men who created Bomber Command. "Victory through Air Power" was their slogan. But I knew in January 1944 that this was not going to happen. A fire storm could happen only when the bombers were able to bomb exceptionally accurately and without serious interference from the defenses. Under our repeated battering the defenses of Berlin were getting stronger, and the scatter of the bombing was getting worse. Only once more, a year after my visit to Wyton, when Germany was invaded and almost overrun, we succeeded again in raising a fire storm. That was in February 1945, in Dresden.

I was a civilian scientist working at Bomber Command headquarters. I had come a long way since the innocent days of Cosmic Unity.

I belonged to a group that gave scientific advice on a statistical study to find the difference between the experience of the crews and the belief of the Command. The belief of the Command during their training was that the propaganda machine increased with experience. With more missions, the crews would learn to spot the German defenses and have a much better chance of survival. It was undoubtedly good for them to have survivors of missions, but their survival to the next mission was rather than to pure chance. It was true in the early years of the war that it was better. Before I arrived, the search Section had received a doctrine of survival that had been warmly accepted.

Unfortunately, with more recent data, it was found that the loss rate was based on complete correlations caused by given easier missions. The loss rate of loss rate with experience in 1944. There were many cases by heroic efforts brought home by a novice crew in the search for lost. Such cases did not show skill and dedication that were detectable. Experience was as impartially as the loss rate at the battle of Berlin.

The disappearance of the loss rate ought to have been a warning signal, telling the Operational Research Section that their experience no longer

D. Ellsberg: . . . cause I'm sure this would apply in the German case and in the strategic bombing case, and in Hiroshima. You know, something that's _____ in connection with Calley. You know, I'll tell you, by the way, a funny parallel. The same issue of the paper that on September 30th, 1969, that told about the dropping of the charges against the special forces of the double agent. It was a story that led me that night to start copying the Pentagon Papers. But when I got hold of the - I went back and got that issue of the paper, years later, and I found that in the same issue was the first public mention of the fact that the army was bringing Lt. William Calley to trial to court martial. And then later was in the spring of '71 that the trial actually occurred and everybody was - I think '71 - in other words, had some relation to Pentagon Papers, and I think it was just before. Might have been '72, but so I followed it very closely and I was very struck at the Letters to the Editor, how many people - "look, I did things like that in World War II or in Korea." The attitude was, if what Calley did was wrong, then what we did was wrong. What I did was wrong. It was conditional, _____ conditional like that. I related that to the what seemed to be the fury of a lot of people, especially veterans or families of veterans at the fact that only Calley was prosecuted. The feeling prevailed by the upper brass that Calley was being made a scapegoat for the others, and it seemed to me that a way of emphasizing what seemed to be a somewhat peculiar attitude in their reaction to the whole Calley _____ was a feeling, as I say, on the one hand there was just what some of these people said. If what Calley did was wrong, then what I did was wrong, and I do not want to accept that; I do not want to believe that. Also a feeling that people who had been in the service had done a lot of things, some of which might have been labelled atrocities, or under some circumstances - or had the sense that they were exposed to doing, what they could have done under orders, things such as Calley had done; even if

they hadn't done it. Or if they had lived with the assurance that following orders, in fact, absolved them from responsibility. That they didn't have to worry about that. And the spectacle of the higher brass absolving themselves and leaving Calley alone to bear the brunt, I think was felt by a lot of people, even as a retrospective betrayal. As though they suddenly felt a near ^{myth} myth. They themselves might not have done what Calley did, but they felt themselves ready to do it. They could have done it. It might have been done if they'd gotten the order, and now they sort of shudder. If we had, the brass might have left us there holding the bag, and they felt, retrospectively, anxious, nervous and resentful that they'd been exposed to these morals - to this moral judgement and that it wasn't true that the higher ups weren't prepared to take the responsibility for having ordered this. But the relation to Hiroshima and strategic bombing was this: I haven't - it's just a conjecture - say, well I'm _____ conjecture. One does not find - I don't think it's true to say, to find, there is an active sense of guilt in America, either about the strategic bombing or about Hiroshima _____. This would be my first proposition, subject to argument.

R. Lifton: _____ standard _____
and they're right at the edge.

E. Markussen: There's not . . .

D. Ellsberg: This is the first conjecture, somewhat independent from the second _____ and that is, however, it's not as though people - _____ people remembered that it happened. They don't know a lot about the strategic bombing but they know something about it; at least something; they don't know the full scale of horror on the whole, and they've forgotten a lot but they know something about it and they certainly know about Hiroshima. And when I say that they don't feel guilt it's because I think that they accept the rationales for Hiroshima - the decision, that Truman gave, and others, as being

not only true, which they aren't, but acceptable, justifiable, legitimate, it's enough; sufficient rationale. But then they do know that that slaughter of people needs a justification, but if it didn't have a proper justification, it would not just be wrong or a crime, it would be a very big crime. If it's a crime at all, it's not a small crime. And therefore that there is semi-conscious, not deeply conscious, not deeply unconscious, but semi-conscious, strong resistance, re-examining or re-thinking Hiroshima or the strategic bombing. And any analysis, any historical analysis that would tend to indicate that it was not justified, because it's like that literal skeleton in the closet, you know, in the family. A family mystery that does not bear close looking at, because if you should conclude that Truman was lying to us, and he was, as a matter of fact, when he said that Hiroshima was the only reasonable alternative to a million U.S. casualties. Then I think that people feel that this is the kind of thing that you would have to feel very guilty about, and were being protected from that as long as the history stays the way it is and as long as the leaders take full responsibility. But we as a people are in deep trouble if it should come up - come about - that after all, it really was a crime. That's a hypothesis I've had for some time. I know, for instance, that my father, and I'm not drawing from the following very small example, but I mention this just as evidence. My father, whose thinking throughout World War II and thereafter, and until the Pentagon Papers was released, was a very conventional, engineering, republican, if anything, a right-wing Republican. And now that he's 93 and he has come up with just a couple of comments from time to time as to - and has indicated to me a real sense of worry about whether America has not asked for it, somehow or other America doesn't have a judgement coming; and I found that startling in him. And I really asked him, you know, what was he referring to, and he mentioned Hiroshima and some others. And there certainly are a lot of other Americans

who have an uneasy feeling that we're heading for a kind of judgement; which is not ordinary conversation at all. I'm saying - contrary to winners - winners imply that it's generally recognized that Hiroshima was a crime. I called him on that afterwards, I said, _____

R. Lifton: Yes, I think there is a difficult line in doing psychological work against recognizing atrocity with - the hell of it is that atrocity begets atrocity because in order not to see the first atrocity as an atrocity . . .

D. Ellsberg: You have to do something else to say it's justified, therefore the other one was justified. At least we believe it.

R. Lifton: Yes, and continue in that kind of a pattern. And it's also - Americans don't have any clear sense of guilt about Hiroshima, I agree with you about that _____
 _____ (inaudible) It almost comes to a sort of numb guilt - something one is resisting feeling, and yet is potentially in one, or close to being in one.

D. Ellsberg: Yes, I'd call you to especially, to your approach to this, to think about the following point. My notes in here?

R. Lifton: Yes. Let us take them, _____ I'm going to put this in my room and change.

D. Ellsberg: I'll take them. I think that to analyze this, it's worth you're really thinking hard, maybe the distinction exists in the murder trial but I haven't found it, to distinguishing between what is often called, very broadly, unconscious guilt, or repressed guilt or denied guilt. An impression that there is a lively sense of guilt there that is being somehow repressed, denied, or something, and something else, which is a consciousness of potential guilt. That if this or this were true, this can be quite conscious. If this

or this or this were true, then I would feel guilty. And that can lead to a very great effort to avoid finding out whether A B or C is true. But it's not quite the same as knowing that you are guilty, and denying it. But knowing that you might be and not wanting to find out.

R. Lifton: (inaudible)

D. Ellsberg: Oh of course, _____ hold of that.

R. Lifton: Now listen Eric, you'd better get ready and then -

END